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EMPLOYMENT LAW-THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT EMPLOYEES'
UNSOLICITED INTERNAL COMPLAINTS




N Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1
does not protect employees' unsolicited internal complaints. 2 The circuits
are currently split on whether ERISA's section 510 anti-retaliation provi-
sion covers employees' unsolicited internal complaints. 3 The court in Ed-
wards erroneously concluded that section 510's language was clear and
strayed from its own precedent of broadly interpreting similar statutory
anti-retaliation provisions.4 As a result, the court disregarded Congress's
intent in passing ERISA and failed to consider the bad public policy that
will ensue from denying employees protection for their unsolicited inter-
nal complaints.
In March 2006, A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc. (A.H. Cornell), a commercial
and residential construction services company, hired Shirley Edwards
(Edwards) as its Director of Human Resources. 5 After three years of
* J.D. 2011, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.A. 1996, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin. The author would like to thank his wife and parents for their
unending love and support.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
2. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011).
3. Compare Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994)(holding that "a refusal to commit violations of ERISA and reporting such violations to
management" was protected under ERISA section 510), and Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw.,
999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding ERISA was "clearly meant to protect whistle
blowers"), with Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (focusing
on "whether the circumstances can fairly be deemed to constitute an 'inquiry"'), and King
v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (reading section 510's "testified or is
about to testify" language more narrowly and finding section 510 requires "something
more formal than written or oral complaints made to a supervisor").
4. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223-25.
5. Id. at 218.
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employment, Edwards complained to A.H. Cornell's management that
the company was violating ERISA. 6 Edwards alleged that her supervisor
ordered her to make false statements to the company's workers' compen-
sation carrier about an injured employee who continued collecting work-
ers' compensation after returning to work.7 In addition, Edwards alleged
that the company tried to discourage employees from opting into group
health coverage by misrepresenting the cost. 8
Edwards sued her employer in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania claiming that she was fired for com-
plaining to management about her employer's ERISA violations. 9 The
district court dismissed Edwards's suit, finding that her complaints were
not protected under section 510 because they were not given as part of an
inquiry. 10 Edwards appealed, and the Secretary of Labor filed a brief as
amicus curiae in support of Edwards.'1
On appeal, a Third Circuit panel affirmed the district court's dismissal
of Edwards's suit, holding that section 510 of ERISA does not protect an
employee's unsolicited internal complaints. 12 Section 510 states "[iut shall
be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discrimi-
nate against any person because he has given information or has testified
or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this [Act]
.... While acknowledging that Edwards had "given information" by
complaining to management, the Third Circuit determined that the em-
ployee's complaints were not protected under section 510's anti-retalia-
tion provision because they were not part of an inquiry or proceeding.
14
First, the court examined dictionary definitions of "inquiry" and "pro-
ceeding" and found that the plain meaning of section 510 was clear and
"that the phrase 'inquiry or proceeding' is limited to more formal ac-
tions."'1 5 Defining an inquiry as "a request for information," the court
determined that Edwards's complaints to management were not part of
an inquiry because she complained voluntarily without her employer re-
questing any information from her about the potential ERISA viola-
tions.16 Defining a proceeding as "'[t]he regular and orderly progression
of a lawsuit' or the 'procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal
6. Id. at 219.
7. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., No. 09-CV-1184, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63720, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2009), affd, 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1604 (2011).
8. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 219.
9. Id. at 218-19.
10. Edwards, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63720, at *13-14.
11. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 219. See generally Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appellant for Reversal, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610
F.3d 217 (3d. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3198), 2009 U.S. 3rd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 165 [hereinafter
Brief for the Secretary].
12. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225-26 (2-1 decision).
13. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
14. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222-23.
15. Id. at 223-24 (quoting King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir.
2003)).
16. Id. at 223 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 864 (9th ed. 2009)).
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or agency,"' the court concluded that Edwards's complaints were not part
of a proceeding because no formal action had occurred at the time she
was fired. 17
Next, the court considered the language of other anti-retaliation stat-
utes and rejected Edwards and the Secretary of Labor's argument that
section 510 should be interpreted broadly.18 The court deemed it unnec-
essary to consider Congress's intent because it viewed the statute's lan-
guage as unambiguous, stating "had Congress been concerned with such a
scenario, Congress could have used broad language mirroring the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII."19 The court also noted that section
15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) extends protection
more "broadly to persons that have 'filed any complaint,' without explic-
itly stating the level of formality required, ' 20 whereas section 510 of ER-
ISA protects only "persons that have 'given information or ... testified
'in an inquiry' or proceeding.'"21
Finally, the Third Circuit declared that its decision was consistent with
its own precedent regarding anti-retaliation statutes.22 The court distin-
guished its holding in Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. United
States Department of Labor23 on the ground that Passaic Valley addressed
section 507(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 24 not section 510 of ER-
ISA.25 In Passaic Valley, the Third Circuit found that the term "proceed-
ing" within section 507(a) of the CWA was ambiguous and could
"reasonably be invoked to encompass a range of complaint activity of
varying degrees of formal legal status."'26
In dissent, Judge Cowen argued that section 510's language is ambigu-
ous and the majority's interpretation is contrary to Congress's intent. 27
The dissent noted that "Congress viewed [section 510] as a crucial part of
ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the
provision of promised benefits. '28 The dissent also suggested that the
majority's "inquiry" standard may be unworkable because it would be
difficult to distinguish between an internal workplace complaint that was
merely an initial step of an investigation and a protected statement that
was made as part of an inquiry.29 Hypothetically, the dissent asked, if "an
employee.., complains to her superior, the superior asks some follow-up
17. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICIIONARY 1324 (9th ed. 2009)).
18. Id. at 223-24.
19. Id. at 224.
20. Id. (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006)).
21. Id. at 224-25 (quoting ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006)).
22. Id. at 224.
23. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 477 (3d.
Cir. 1993).
24. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
25. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225.
26. Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 478.
27. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 226 (2-1 decision) (Cowen, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 226-27 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143
(1990)).
29. Id. at 227-28.
20111
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questions, and the employee responds,.., why should such responses be
protected while ... an employer is essentially permitted ... to fire an
employee immediately after she makes an informal complaint instead of
conducting an investigation . . . ?3
Although section 510's language differs slightly from other anti-retalia-
tion provisions, the dissent argued that the court should nevertheless
treat similar provisions in similar remedial federal statutes consistently.31
The dissent pointed out that the majority's interpretation is inconsistent
with the court's prior holding in Passaic Valley, where the court held that
the term "proceeding" was ambiguous in an analogous anti-retaliation
provision of the CWA.32 The dissent propounded that section 510 should
actually be construed more broadly than similar anti-retaliation provi-
sions in the CWA or FLSA because section 510 protects inquiries rather
than merely proceedings (as in the CWA and FLSA) and protects em-
ployees who give information rather than merely those who testify.33 In
fact, in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.-the case relied on by the major-
ity-the Second Circuit found that the language of section 510 is broader
than section 15(a)(3) of FLSA.34 Yet, the majority in Edwards came to
the opposite conclusion in finding that FLSA extends protection more
broadly than section 510.35
The majority's holding in Edwards that section 510's language was
clear and unambiguous is inconsistent with the court's broad interpreta-
tion of anti-retaliation provisions in other remedial statutes.36 In Brock
v. Richardson, the Third Circuit did not use a dictionary to interpret a
similarly worded anti-retaliation provision in the FLSA;37 instead, the
court "indicated a willingness to go beyond the bare language of the [stat-
ute] itself,"' 38 stating that "courts interpreting the [FLSA's] anti-retalia-
tion provision have looked to its animating spirit in applying it to
activities that might not have been explicitly covered by the language." '39
Likewise, in Passaic Valley, the Third Circuit did not rely on a dictionary
to define the term "proceeding" as it did in Edwards; instead, the court
looked at the statute's purpose and legislative history and found that the
term "proceeding" could "encompass a range of complaint activity."'40
30. Id. at 228.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 229.
33. Id. at 230 (comparing the language of section 507(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) (2006), with the language of section 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006)).
34. Id. at 230-31 (quoting Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir.
2005)).
35. Id. at 224-25 (majority opinion); see also supra notes 19-20.
36. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 228-31 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
37. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (under the FLSA, it is unlawful "to discharge
... any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to
be instituted any proceeding under or related to this [Act]").
38. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 230 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
39. Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987).
40. Compare Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,
478 (3d. Cir. 1993), with Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
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The court in Passaic Valley found that the term "proceeding" was ambig-
uous in section 507(a) of the CWA. 41 Section 507(a) states that "[n]o
person shall fire ... any employee ... by reason of the fact that such
employee ... has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any
proceeding under this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any
proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of the
[CWA] ., 42 As the Secretary of Labor noted in the amicus brief, the court
in Passaic Valley found that the CWA protects unsolicited internal com-
plaints where the statute "facially protects only filing, instituting or giving
testimony in 'any proceeding;"' thus, section 510 of ERISA, which "ex-
pressly covers . . . all 'information' given in 'any inquiry,"' should also
protect employees' unsolicited complaints.43
Because the majority did not follow its own precedent and incorrectly
concluded that section 510's language was clear, the court failed to prop-
erly address Congress's intent in passing ERISA.44 "Section 510's legisla-
tive history demonstrates Congress's intent that the provision be liberally
construed... 'to provide.., broad remedies for redressing or preventing
violations [of ERISA]."' 45 ERISA's leading sponsor, "Senator Javits,
during the debates on the passage of ERISA, characterized section 510 as
'provid[ing] a remedy for any person fired such as is provided for a per-
son discriminated against because of race or sex, for example.'" 46 "It is
intended that coverage under the Act be construed liberally to provide
the maximum degree of protection to working men and women covered
by private retirement programs. ' 47 Had the court properly weighed Con-
gress's intent and liberally construed section 510, the court likely would
have held that Edwards's unsolicited internal complaints were protected
under section 510 of ERISA.48
The Third Circuit's narrow construction of ERISA's anti-retaliation
provision discourages employees from bringing potential ERISA viola-
tions to their employer's attention and will likely lead to bad policy.4
9
41. Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 478.
42. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
43. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 11, at 22-23.
44. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 227 (Cowen, J., dissenting); see also IUE AFL-CIO Pen-
sion Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[A] court need
not rely on the literal language of ERISA in interpreting its provisions, but may also look
to the intent of the statute.") (citation omitted).
45. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 11, at 11 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35
(1973)).
46. Id. (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 30044 (1973)). Senator Javits's comment suggests an
intention that protection under ERISA should reach broadly like the protection against
discrimination provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.
47. S. REP. No. 93-127, at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4854.
48. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224 (acknowledging that if section 510 were ambiguous,
the court would "construe the provision in favor of plan participants").
49. See Brief for the Secretary, supra note 11, at 30-31 (citing Disabled in Action of
Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (arguing that a narrow reading




Under the Third Circuit's reading of section 510, employers can ignore
employees' complaints rather than initiate an inquiry or proceeding, or
they can simply fire employees before they are able to begin a formal
proceeding.50 The Ninth Circuit has stated that "[t]he normal first step in
giving information or testifying ... would be to present the problem first
to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan."151 If an employee is
"discharged for raising the problem, the process of giving information or
testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatory discharge discourages
the whistle blower before the whistle is blown."5 2
The problem with the Third Circuit's decision in Edwards is the court's
reliance on dictionary definitions in interpreting section 510 of ERISA
without considering Congress's intent.5 3 The outcome of the case essen-
tially turned on the court's decision that section 510's language is not am-
biguous-the court even acknowledged that if the provision were
ambiguous, it would have been construed in favor of the employee-but
the court relied on a dictionary to show that the statute's language is
clear.5 4 The court's prior interpretation of similar anti-retaliation provi-
sions and the current split of authority on the issue indicate that section
510's language is not absolutely clear.
Once the court erroneously decided that section 510's language is clear,
it disregarded Congress's intent in passing ERISA and failed to ade-
quately address the impact that the court's decision will have on public
policy. The Third Circuit's holding undermines the efficacy of section 510
because employers can either ignore whistleblowers or fire them for mak-
ing unsolicited internal complaints. Potential whistleblowers will be
stopped in their tracks before they can give information or testify. Many
employees would prefer to first report ERISA violations to their supervi-
sors rather than voice their complaints through a formal inquiry or pro-
ceeding. By essentially requiring employees to go immediately to the
courthouse for protection, the Third Circuit deters employees from re-
porting ERISA violations. Employees may elect to remain silent and
even assist in their company's fraud rather than risk retaliation from their
employers. The court in Edwards should have construed section 510
broadly, as it did with similarly worded anti-retaliation provisions in other
statutes, and should have effectuated Congress's intent and furthered the
policy goals of ERISA by holding that employees' unsolicited internal
complaints are protected under section 510 of ERISA.55
50. See id. at 29-31 (arguing that allowing companies to investigate and correct ER-
ISA violations is more cost effective than requiring employees to file complaints through
litigation or adversarial proceedings).
51. Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
52. Id.
53. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
54. Id. at 223-24.
55. See Brief for the Secretary, supra note 11, at 32.
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